

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: ~~Community Counterintelligence Staff~~
 Intelligence Community Staff
 Via Ames/ISC, Rm. 1225 Ames Bldg.
 Washington, D.C. 20505

EXTENSION

NO

DATE

ER-0603x/1
 21 MAR 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

26 MAR 1986

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
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B-602-JR

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21 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: SIG-I Members


FROM: Richard G. Stilwell
Chairman, SIG-I Working Group

SUBJECT: Comments on SSCI Draft Report

1. At the meeting on 20 March, the review of subject comments resulted in two categories of changes:

- a. Minor textual modifications, agreed to at the table.
- b. Several substantive changes, requiring reformulation of the proposed comment and post-meeting review by the SIG-I principals.

2. I attach the revised text of category b. comments. You are respectfully requested to give the attached your earliest attention and let me know, telephonically, if the new wording is not acceptable. I shall be presenting the final package to the DCI on the afternoon of 24 March.


Richard G. Stilwell

Attachment:
a/s

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B-608-1K

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3. The National Strategic Security Program should evaluate security countermeasures resource priorities for the NSC and OMB on an annual basis. Security resources should be identified by function and program in departmental and agency budget justifications. The Administration and the Congress should consider additional ways to implement a more coherent budget process for security programs.

COMMENT: See comment on Recommendation 1.

Concur with the final sentence. As to balance of recommendation:

- Not all resources devoted to security can be separately identified. However, it should be noted that a national-level program already exists for the review and assessment of the telecommunications and automated information systems security programs and budgets for the US Government. (NSA add)
- Department/agency heads, charged as they are with the safeguarding of information and other property entrusted to their care, must determine the appropriate mix of security measures within the resources made available by Congress.
- Periodic evaluation of priorities, executive branch-wide, would not be particularly meaningful. On the other hand, such evaluations might be helpful in illuminating major differences in approach among departments/agencies, areas where putative vulnerability rather than threat has been criterion for resource allocation and uneven support of joint programs.

11. Agreement should be reached as soon as possible on a "single scope" background investigation for all Top Secret and SCI clearances. The uniform policy should provide for: (a) less costly and more timely background investigations and clearances; (b) highest priority for meeting the five-year reinvestigation requirement; and (c) a subject interview in all cases.

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COMMENT: The above referenced working group is charged with recommending a government-wide standard for Top Secret clearances. The DCI has statutory responsibilities for SCI clearance standards. While there is merit in identical Top Secret and SCI standards--and DoD has repeatedly so urged--it is not an achievable result unless and until the personnel research effort DoD has under way leads to major change in the methodology for determining an individual's bona fides.

(DDCI
mod.)

Concur in principle that reinvestigations should have higher priority than accorded in recent years. However, the caveats expressed in the comment on Recommendation 10 apply.

18. The President should issue a new executive order on personnel security. The order should provide for government-wide minimum standards and procedures and a policy oversight office similar to the Information Security Oversight Office. It should focus exclusively on personnel security programs regarding access to classified information and to sites where classified information is maintained. Drafting of this order should not delay action on other recommendations.

COMMENT: The DoJ-led working group, mandated by NSDD-84, has these matters under active consideration, and is charged to provide recommendations to the NSC.

(New)

25. By executive order, require each agency to establish procedures governing authorized disclosure of classified information to the news media, including background disclosures of information that remains classified. Such procedures should require records for accountability, consultation with originating agencies, and designation of officials authorized to disclose classified information to the media.


COMMENT: Concur in substance. This important subject, basic to the control of leaks, was specifically addressed in NSDD-84. Implementing procedures--to include designation of officials authorized to make disclosures and under what conditions--are under review.

(New)

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42. The new Moscow embassy building should be certifiably "clean" before it is occupied. All agencies who will occupy the building must agree it is safe to do so.



(New) 25X1

51. The National Strategic Security Program should ensure implementation of the Stilwell Commission recommendations on National Disclosure Policy not only for military information, but for sensitive intelligence and nuclear matters as well.

COMMENT: The relevant Stilwell Commission recommendations have already been implemented. Application to other categories of information will be examined. It is worth noting that similar, but more stringent, rules already apply to national intelligence and cryptologic information.

(NSA add)

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